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NOTE 
Second Injury Funds Nationally and in 
Missouri – Liability, Functionality, and 
Viability in Modern Times 
Rhett Buchmiller* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A Second Injury Fund (“SIF”) is a statutory form of workers’ compensa-
tion relief operating under state law.1  SIFs allow employers to reduce their 
own liability for a worker’s injury if part of the harm from that injury was 
caused by a previously existing disability.2  The need for SIFs arises from the 
possibility that workers with prior injuries who are then reinjured are likely to 
experience greater harm than other workers.3  As a result, employers could be 
exposed to greater liability, which might incentivize employers to discriminate 
against potential employees with previous injuries.4   
SIFs are designed to prevent discrimination against potential employees 
who have pre-existing medical disabilities by eliminating the financial burden 
that may be placed on the employer due to the increased risk associated with 
employing a previously injured employee.5  SIF statutes achieve their goals by 
allowing either the employer/insurer or the injured employee to file claims 
against the SIF in the state’s workers compensation system, requesting either 
“permanent total disability” benefits, and/or, in some states, “permanent partial 
disability” benefits.6   
While a major component of workers’ compensation systems for much of 
the twentieth century, legislatures across the country have discontinued SIFs 
  
* B.A., University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2019-2020.  I would like to thank Professor Rafael Gely and the Missouri Law Review 
staff for their advice and guidance in writing this article. 
1.  Second Injury Fund, MO. DEP’T OF LAB. AND INDUS. REL., https://la-
bor.mo.gov/DWC/Division_Units/SIF_Unit/sif_home [perma.cc/8MJD-HHJF]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Harry W. Dahl, The Iowa Second Injury Fund – Time for Change, 39 DRAKE 
L. REV. 101, 103 (1989). 
 4. Id.   
 5. R. Shafer, Twelve Things You Should Know About Subsequent Injury Funds 
and Disabled Workers, AMAXX WORKERS COMP RESOURCE CTR. (May 8, 2010), 
https://blog.reduceyourworkerscomp.com/2010/05/twelve-things-you-should-know-
about-subsequent-injury-funds-and-disabled-workers/ [perma.cc/44D9-AK46]. 
 6. Id.   
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over the last twenty years.7  Two main reasons inform these efforts: funding 
concerns and perceived redundancies created by the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (“ADA”).8   
Like many other state legislatures, the Missouri General Assembly ad-
dressed the issue of what to do with their SIF in 2013. The legislature, ignoring 
national trends, enacted legislation intended to provide additional funds to the 
Missouri Second Injury Fund (“Missouri SIF”) while simultaneously narrow-
ing its scope.9  This simple concept was disrupted in 2017 by the decision in 
Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri,10 where the Missouri Court of Appeals for 
the Western District effectively nullified the 2013 Amendments for a term of 
years.11 
The reasoning of Gattenby raised several questions about the future of the 
Missouri SIF.  Part II focuses first on the historical origins of SIFs in order to 
demonstrate their purpose and illustrate how SIFs were designed to achieve 
their goals.  Part III will then discuss recent trends nationally, especially in light 
of the ADA, which caused the closure of many SIFs.  Lastly, Part IV will turn 
to the Missouri SIF and examine how Missouri conformed to national trends 
and what this has done recently in light of these trends.  
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The SIF for the State of Missouri and similar injury funds across the na-
tion were initially created for similar purposes: to stop discrimination against 
disabled workers in the hiring process and to encourage the retention of work-
ers by limiting potential employer liability in case of reinjury.12   
The operation of SIFs is best illustrated with a hypothetical scenario.13  
During a previous job, an employee lost his right hand.  Despite this, later in 
  
 7. David Tobenkin Don’t Overlook Second-Injury Funds, SOC’Y FOR HUM. 
RESOURCE MGMT. (July 1, 2009), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-maga-
zine/pages/0709employmentlaw.aspx [perma.cc/SA7W-A3F3]. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Governor Nixon Signs Legislation to Address Missouri’s Failing Second In-
jury Fund, AARON SACHS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. BLOG (Jul. 12, 2013), https://www.auto-
injury.com/blog/2013/july/governor-nixon-signs-legislation-to-address-miss/ 
[perma.cc/WE8W-7MT2]. 
 10. 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017), overruled by Cosby v. Treasurer of Mis-
souri, 579 S.W.3d 202, 205 n.5 (Mo. 2019). 
 11. Id. at 862.; but see infra Part III.B for a discussion of recent case law overrul-
ing Gattenby. 
 12. Wuebbeling v. West Cty. Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 617–18 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) (referring to permanent total disability but also saying the same concept applies 
to permanent partial disability). 
 13. For simplicity, this scenario utilizes Missouri case law but only does so to il-
lustrate the basic functionality of the SIF, which is common to all similar funds.   
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life he managed to find work with a different employer, one which only re-
quired him to use one hand.  While working for his new employer, he lost his 
left hand.  Normally the loss of the left hand, while debilitating, would not 
totally disable him.  The problem arises when the prior loss of his right hand is 
also considered.  These two injuries, his prior right hand loss and his subse-
quent left hand loss, combine to create an overall greater disability – now he 
cannot perform any jobs at all – rendering him totally disabled.  This combined 
effect is not attributable to either employer as each was only responsible for the 
injury that occurred while the employee worked for them. After the employers 
pay for each hand, who compensates the employee for the combined effect of 
both injuries?    
Without SIF-like statutes, the employee’s most recent employer would 
bear the heavy burden of total disability liability, which in Missouri is defined 
as an “inability to compete on the open labor market,” instead of the injury for 
which the employer was actually responsible.14  With SIF-like statutes, the em-
ployer is responsible only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury 
that occurred while the employee was working for the employer.15  The re-
maining liability, namely the “extra” liability caused by the combination of the 
prior and subsequent injuries, would fall to the SIF.16  In short, each employer 
would be responsible for paying disability benefits arising from each respective 
injury that occurred while the employee worked for them.  The SIF would be 
responsible for paying the excess disability caused by the combined injuries.17 
New York enacted the first of these funds, the “Special Disability Fund,” 
in 1916.18  The Special Disability Fund set out a scheme by which employers 
would not be liable for the entire degree of a worker’s injury and the state 
would fund part of the employee’s disability benefits.19  This fund was only 
available if the employee was totally disabled due to the combination of a 
preexisting disability and the work injury itself.20  An increased demand for 
protection of previously disabled workers due to World War II prompted the 
International Association of Industrial Accidents Boards and Commissions 
(“IAIABC”) to create a model for SIF statutes.21  Thirty-three states adopted a 
  
 14. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. 1963).  
 15. Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo., 126 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. at 388–89. 
 18. Second Injury Funds, NANOPDF.COM, 2 (Apr. 30, 2018), https://nano-
pdf.com/download/second-injury-funds_pdf# [perma.cc/HD85-5THX] [hereinafter 
SIF]. Other similar funds are modernly referred to as “Second Injury Fund,” “Subse-
quent Injury Fund,” “Special Compensation Fund,” etc. Id. at 1. 
 19. Id. at 2.  
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
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SIF-like statute in the years immediately following World War II, with the ma-
jority adopting the model nearly as written.22  By 1991, practically all states 
had a SIF.23   
A.  Typical Historic Variations among Second Injury Funds 
Although adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, the model changed over 
time.  The statutes creating these funds vary in terms of the liability imposed, 
funding sources, and general structure.24  The model proposed by the IAIABC 
only allowed for liability in the event that an employee was totally disabled 
because the employee had previously lost a body part – hand, arm, or leg – in 
the past and lost their corresponding body part on the job.25  Nebraska’s statute 
reflects a typical modern approach, as it was in effect in 1997 prior to its clo-
sure.26  The statute has been reproduced below: 
If an employee who has a preexisting permanent partial disability 
whether from compensable injury or otherwise, which is or is likely to 
be a hindrance or obstacle to his or her obtaining employment or ob-
taining reemployment if the employee should become unemployed and 
which was known to the employer prior to the occurrence of a subse-
quent compensable injury, receives a subsequent compensable injury 
resulting in additional permanent partial or in permanent total disability 
so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the combined 
disabilities is substantially greater than that which would have resulted 
from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if the employee 
is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disa-
bilities, the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only 
for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted 
from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability.27 
This statute expanded on the original model in a number of ways but was 
also self-limited to better conform with the original model’s intent.28  Specifi-
  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 10.  
 24. See infra App. A (listing each state’s current or former statutes outlining lia-
bility under the relevant SIF law, with few exceptions).  Further references to a state’s 
SIF statute will be referring to Appendix A.  This appendix was compiled by the author. 
 25. Second Injury Funds, supra note 1, at 2. 
 26. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-128 (LexisNexis 2014).  Often Second Injury 
Funds are not repealed outright; instead, they are closed from further claims.  This has 
the purpose of allowing already adjudicated claims to continue being compensated but 
stops new claims from coming in. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Second Injury Funds, supra note 1. 
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cally, the Nebraska statute, which further developed the original model pro-
posed by the IAIABC, makes compensation for the combined effect of preex-
isting disabilities and subsequent injuries acceptable.29  It self-limits by requir-
ing the combined effect of the two injuries to make the overall disability “sub-
stantially greater,” a minimum threshold that is present in many SIF-like stat-
utes.30 
1.  Acceptable Pre-Existing Disabilities 
States vary in terms of what pre-existing disabilities qualify for coverage 
under the SIF statute in the event of subsequent injury.  Some states have ex-
panded the scope of injuries that qualify as preexisting.31  For instance, twelve 
of the most recent SIF statutes require that the preexisting disability be on a 
specific list of disabilities.32  Some states, such as Pennsylvania, stick closely 
to the original model by only allowing SIF compensation in the event of a sub-
sequent injury if the preexisting injury is the loss of use of a hand, arm, foot, 
leg, or eye.33  Other SIFs, such as Ohio, specify a lengthy list of potential preex-
isting disabilities, including epilepsy, amputation, black lung disease, and Par-
kinson’s disease.34   
The remaining thirty-six funds have a greater variety of potential preex-
isting disabilities because they do not specify a list of compensable disabili-
ties.35  However, many states, such as Nevada, require that the previous disa-
bility constitute a “hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment.”36  Courts 
have generally interpreted this language to mean only that a pre-existing injury 
has the potential to combine with a new injury to constitute a hindrance or 
obstacle in obtaining employment, not that it actually does so.37  Some states 
have lowered their potential liability more directly by requiring the minimum 
  
 29. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-128 (LexisNexis 2000). 
 30. Id.  
 31. Second Injury Funds, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 32. See App. A.  These states are Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
 33. 77 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 516 (West 2019). 
 34. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.343 (West 2018). 
 35. See App. A. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 36. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 616B.587(3) (LexisNexis 2014). 
 37. Concepcion v. Lear Corp., 173 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting 
E.W. v. Kan. City, Mo. Sch. Dist., 89 S.W.3d 527, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)), overruled 
on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc)). 
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threshold of disability to be a certain “percent” before the preexisting disability 
qualifies.38  The guidelines for calculating these percentages vary greatly, but 
many states require medical doctors to determine the percentage of disability.39 
Another variation occurs from the nature of the preexisting injury, with at 
least five states requiring the cause to be from a prior industrial accident.40  The 
remaining forty-three states with functionally-equivalent SIF statutes41 use lan-
guage such as “from any cause,”42 or “from compensable injury, occupational 
disease, pre-existing disease, or otherwise.”43  This kind of language allows a 
much more expansive set of potential preexisting disabilities to qualify for SIF 
liability.   
The most common differentiating factor between typical SIF liability in 
these states was the requirement that an employer be aware of the preexisting 
condition prior to hiring or retention of the employee.44  Approximately twelve 
states required that the employer be aware of the preexisting condition at the 
time of hiring or the time the second injury occurred.45  The statutory language 
that required the employer’s knowledge generally stated that “[i]n order to 
qualify for reimbursement . . . the employer must establish . . . that the employer 
had knowledge of the permanent physical impairment at the time that the em-
ployee was hired.”46  Some states require written confirmation of this 
knowledge: “[T]he employer . . . must establish by written records that it had 
knowledge of the preexisting disability at the time the employee was hired.”47  
Conversely, some states, such as Minnesota, require that the preexisting disa-
bility be registered with the state or the employer prior to the subsequent injury, 
bypassing the need for knowledge.48 
  
 38. Sachi Barreiro, How Do Disability Ratings Work for Workers’ Compensa-
tion?, ALLLAW, http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/workers-compensation/disabil-
ity-ratings.html (last visited May 23, 2019) [perma.cc/2XL7-G3AW]. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See App. A.  These states are Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Rhode Island, and 
Texas. 
 41. Id. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Del-
aware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
 42. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (West 2018). 
 43. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.120 (West 2018). 
 44. See SIF, supra note 18. 
 45. See App. A.  These states are Arizona, Alaska, Florida, Louisiana, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee.   
 46. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 42-9-400 (2018). 
 47. 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-37-4 (1997) (repealed 1998). 
 48. MINN. STAT. § 176.131 (1991) (repealed 1992). 
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2.  Variations in Minimum Injury Thresholds to Trigger SIF Liability 
The intent of SIFs has historically been to prevent employers from being 
saddled with extra liability for employing a worker who is more likely to incur 
larger disability payments than a non-disabled worker.49  This was true with 
the original model proposed by the IAIABC, which only allowed for SIF lia-
bility in the event of a total disability, and it has continued with a number of 
modern SIFs.50   
A different type of liability emerged with the later adoption of language 
that allowed for liability if the preexisting and subsequent injuries combined to 
create a disability that was “substantially greater . . . than that which would 
have resulted from the subsequent injury alone.”51  Today, fifteen states define 
SIF eligibility as total disability – though the definition of total disability var-
ies.52  The states that do not have this absolute bar to permanent partial disabil-
ity claims sometimes require the employer to pay a certain amount of the com-
bined effect.53  For example, in Minnesota, the employer must pay the first 
fifty-two weeks of monetary benefits to the employee.54  Other states require 
the combined effect to meet a statutory minimum of disability.55  California, 
for example, requires the combined effect to create a permanent disability of 
seventy percent or more.56 
B.  The Missouri SIF Historically 
Missouri’s SIF was originally created in 1943, following the national 
trend of establishing SIFs to deal with the influx of veterans from World War 
  
 49. WORKERS’ COMP PRACTICE GRP., Issue # 43 Status of Second Injury Funds, 
SEDGWICK: SPOTLIGHT ON WORKERS’ COMP. (Dec. 7, 2012), https://www.sedg-
wick.com/assets/uploads/documents/Issue-43-StatusofSecondInjuryFunds.pdf. 
[perma.cc/4Q66-BS5S]. 
 50. Id.  
 51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400 (2018). 
 52. See App. A. (these states are Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont, Washington, and West Virginia); compare TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.161 
(West 2018) (requiring the injury to result in a specific loss of major functionality, ex-
tremity, or organ in order to receive total disability benefits) with Stoddard v. Hagadone 
Corp., 147 P.3d 162, 167 (Idaho 2009) (requiring the injury to only limit the employee 
so that no reasonable market for their services exist). 
 53. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.131 (West 1990) (repealed 1992). 
 54. Id. 
 55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 (2019). 
 56. Id.  For a discussion on how disability percentages are generally calculated, 
see Settling a Case, MO. DEP’T LAB. AND INDUS. REL., https://la-
bor.mo.gov/DWC/Injured_Workers/settling_case#TOI10D [perma.cc/6LWU-Q6RD]. 
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II.57  Missouri’s 1991 SIF allowed for workers’ eligible preexisting disabilities 
to be from nearly any source that constituted a “compensable injury or other-
wise.”58  Missouri’s 1991 SIF also allowed for the resulting disability to be 
either partial or total in degree, with no minimums for the amount of change 
resulting from the combination.59  Missouri’s SIF has never had a knowledge 
or certification requirement.60 
The mode of liability for Missouri’s 1991 SIF also protected employers 
directly by absolving them of liability and only giving the option of SIF liabil-
ity to the employee via separate suit.61  The requirement for finding permanent 
partial disability was that the effects of the preexisting and subsequent disabil-
ities combined were “greater than the sum of the degree or percentage of the 
two disabilities.”62  For a finding of permanent total disability, the employee 
had to be incapable of competing on the open labor market, as established by 
expert testimony.63  The primary difference between these two standards was 
that in the former, an employee was still capable of finding work while in the 
latter, they were not.  In Missouri today, this distinction is not about the em-
ployee’s ability to work anywhere but the employee’s ability to compete with 
non-disabled workers on the open labor market.64  Missouri’s 1991 SIF also 
served as a fallback insurer for injured employees that worked for employers 
without proper workers’ compensation insurance.65 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
This section will focus on the recent developments of SIF statutes nation-
ally and in Missouri specifically.  
  
 57. Jason McClitis, Missouri’s Second Injury Fund – Should It Stay or Should It 
Go: An Examination of the Question Facing the Missouri State Legislature, 74 MO. L. 
REV. 399, 401 (2009). 
 58. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1 (2018). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Brown v. Treasurer of Mo. 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id. at 483.  
 64. Id.  
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.5 (2018). 
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A.  National Trends in the Wake of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Today, SIFs face extinction for two main reasons: they are subject to a 
greater deal of liability than anticipated and legislators see the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) as an adequate replacement.66 
Today, active SIFs have become far less common due to a number of fac-
tors, but most notably67 because the ADA was passed in 1990.68  The ADA’s 
stated purpose is to provide a “national mandate for the elimination of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities.”69  The ADA applies to employers 
which have fifteen or more employees,70 whereas SIFs are not subject to this 
limitation.71  To achieve its goal, the ADA allows workers who believe they 
have been discriminated against to sue their past, present, and future employ-
ers.72 
In theory, the ADA “bans any discrimination against qualified handi-
capped job applicants.”73  Therefore, the SIF’s role in preventing discrimina-
tion against people with disabilities in the hiring process “ceases to exist.”74  
Each of the eighteen states that have nullified their SIFs, through repeal or clo-
sure, have done so since the passage of the ADA.75   
  
 66. A Review of the South Carolina Second Injury Fund, S.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY: 
LEGIS. AUDIT COUNCIL (Mar. 2007), https://lac.sc.gov/sites/default/files/Docu-
ments/Legislative%20Audit%20Council/Reports/A-K/SIF.pdf. [perma.cc/8DK3-
8VZF] [hereinafter S.C. Audit]. 
 67. Id.  
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). 
 69. Id.  
 70. § 12111. 
 71. Timothy R. Hancock, Comment, Apportionment Between Preexisting Condi-
tions and Work-Related Injuries: Why Wyoming Needs a Second Injury Fund, 11 WYO. 
L. REV. 525, 543 (2011). 
 72. Id.  
 73. Catherine M. Doud, Oklahoma’s Special Indemnity Fund: A Fund Without A 
Function?, 30 TULSA L.J. 754, 765 (1995). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Hancock, supra note 71, at 529 n.42; see also supra notes 64–66 and accom-
panying text. 
9
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The ADA is not the sole cause of the repeal of SIF-like statutes, as states 
like South Carolina,76 Connecticut,77 and Georgia78 have abolished their SIF 
statutes for other reasons.  Another problem SIF-like statutes have encountered 
is underestimated levels of liability.  The loss of SIF funds came from either 
direct repeal of SIF statutes or the phasing out of the statutes by restricting 
claims for injuries that occurred past certain dates (or “sunsetting”).79  To date, 
of the forty-seven states that once had an active SIF statute, eighteen states 
have either repealed or sunsetted their SIF statute.80   
Alternatively, opponents of SIFs argue that SIF statutes “have failed to 
meet the objective of promoting the hiring of disabled workers.”81  Represent-
atives of former SIFs have opined that their states have not suffered particularly 
negative effects following the closure of their SIFs.82  However, no compre-
hensive studies compare the states that have eliminated their SIFs with those 
that have not.83 
B.  Missouri SIF, A Work In Progress 
In 1993, Missouri altered its SIF eligibility requirements in response to a 
wave of changes across the country.84  Namely, the SIF was amended to include 
  
 76. South Carolina’s SIF was consistently cited by its opponents as having “bil-
lions of dollars” of unfunded liabilities. Martin M. Simons, A Review of the South Car-
olina Second Injury Fund, REIMBURSEMENT CONSULTANTS INC., 
http://rcinc.us/pdfs/A%20reiew%20of%20the%20SC%20SIF.pdf (last visited May 24, 
2019) [perma.cc/F7UN-J53M]. 
 77. Connecticut’s SIF funding was consistently outpaced by its liabilities until 
eventually it reached an estimated six billion dollars of liability. Zachary D. Schurin, 
Monkey-Business: Connecticut’s Six Billion Dollar Gorilla and the Insufficiency of the 
Emergence of the ADA as Justification for the Elimination of Second Injury Funds, 7 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 135, 135 (2007). 
 78. Georgia’s SIF had steadily increasing liability up until it sunsetted in 2006. 
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund: Claims Evaluation & Payment History, STATE OF GA., 
2 (2010), https://sitf.georgia.gov/sites/sitf.georgia.gov/files/im-
ported/SITF/Files/Stats%20CY%202010.pdf [perma.cc/QR56-RPSP]. 
 79. Tobenkin, supra note 7. 
 80. See App. A (these states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, New 
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and West Vir-
ginia).  Oregon and Wyoming are not included in this analysis, as they have never had 
a SIF statute, and Vermont is not included as its SIF statute was repealed before it was 
ever active. See S.C. Audit, supra note 66; Hancock, supra note 71. 
 81. Christopher Boggs, Second Injury Funds: Are They Still Necessary or Just a 
Drain On the System?, INS. J. (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.insurancejour-
nal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/25/360666.htm [perma.cc/UB7P-LFNG]. 
 82. S.C. Audit, supra note 66. 
 83. Hancock, supra note 71, at 540. 
 84. See MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.1 (2018). 
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minimum thresholds for preexisting disabilities and subsequent injuries.85  At 
a minimum, to qualify for SIF coverage, a preexisting disability and the subse-
quent injury individually had to equal fifty weeks of compensability if done to 
the body as a whole – anything not an extremity – and fifteen percent disability 
if done to a major extremity – arm or leg.86  Lawmakers also introduced lan-
guage requiring the preexisting disability to be a “hindrance or obstacle” to 
employment.87  These limitations were put in place to “eliminate inconsisten-
cies” and “provide a more objective standard” to determine the Missouri SIF’s 
liability.88  As part of the amendments, the Director of the Division of Workers’ 
Compensation had the ability to set surcharges to workers’ compensation pre-
miums at an amount necessary to cover the Missouri SIF’s obligations.89  The 
amendments gave the Director this power, as there was no cap on the surcharge 
which funded the SIF.90  In 2005, a cap was placed on the Missouri SIF which 
inhibited the Missouri SIF’s ability to pay claims.91 
Two audits, released in 2007, discussed the threat of insolvency faced by 
the SIF and offered possible solutions.92  The most recent audit reported that 
the SIF’s expenditures had more than tripled over the course of ten years, re-
sulting in total expenditures of $63.9 million in 2006.93  The Committee on 
Legislative Oversight acknowledged that multiple reports found the SIF would 
soon be insolvent and recommended changes of its own.94  The Committee’s 
report found that the SIF was struggling due to an increase in claims filed de-
spite a consistent number of workplace injuries.95  This change effected the 
solvency of the SIF because the funding remained the same but liability did 
  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Loven v. Greene Cty., 63 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Culp 
v. Lohr Distrib. Co, 898 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc)). 
 89. Skirvin v. Treasurer of Mo., No. 75541, 2013 WL 216028, at *15 (Mo. Ct. 
App. Jan. 22, 2013). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. McClitis, supra note 57, at 408–09. 
 93. Review of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations: Second Injury 
Fund, OVERSIGHT DIV.: COMM. ON LEGIS. RES., iv (2007) (recommending changes to 
encourage settlement of claims, increasing the minimum threshold for prior disabilities, 
and limiting the type of prior disability that could be considered) [hereinafter Review], 
http://www.moga.mo.gov/oversight/over07/PDF/Second%20Injury%20Fund.pdf 
[perma.cc/RG5G-Z2R4]. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 3.   
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not.96  The funding remained the same because the number of workplace inju-
ries was not changing.97  Despite this, the number of SIF claims rose, putting 
the SIF in the precarious position of trying to compensate more workers with 
the same budget.98  To deal with the solvency issue, the audits recommended 
either limiting the potential liability of the SIF legislatively or increasing the 
statutorily authorized three percent surcharge that funded the SIF.99 
The Committee’s predictions were fully realized in 2012, when the SIF 
began to delay payments due to insufficient funds.100  From July 2012 until 
November 2015, the SIF did not have the necessary funds to meet its obliga-
tions for permanent partial disability claims.101  In fact, the SIF settled a total 
of only forty claims from 2010 to 2012.102  Comparing this to the 2,905 claims 
settled in 2009 alone,103 this decline shows that the SIF was experiencing the 
effects of its limitations. 
The General Assembly responded with the 2013 Amendments, which 
elected to limit liability and increase funding, if only for a short time.104  The 
General Assembly authorized a three percent increase to the surcharge, which 
would fund the SIF, from 2014 until 2021.105  This measure doubled the fund-
ing of the SIF.106  Additionally, the General Assembly severely limited the 
combined results that qualified for liability under the SIF.107  On its face, it 
appeared that no claims could be filed against the SIF for permanent partial 
disability benefits under Section 287.220.3 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 
after January 1, 2014.108  The General Assembly also limited the scope of 
preexisting disabilities that could be considered for a claim against the SIF for 
permanent total disability benefits.109  On its face, the statute appeared to limit 
preexisting disabilities – no matter when they occurred – to disabilities stem-
ming only from military duty, a prior work injury, preexisting disabilities 
  
 96. Id.  
 97. McClitis, supra note 57, at 408. 
 98. Id. at 409.  
 99. Review, supra note 93, at 33–34. 
 100. MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2017 Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. & 
INDUS. RELATIONS, 25 (2017) [hereinafter 2017 Annual Report], https://la-
bor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2017AnnualReport.pdf. 
[perma.cc/U6YM-B7ZW]. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 23. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 3.  
 105. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.715.6 (2018). 
 106. MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2014 Annual Report, DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. 
RELATIONS, 9 (2014), https://labor.mo.gov/sites/la-
bor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2014AnnualReport.pdf. [perma.cc/9627-27H6]. 
 107. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(2) (2018). 
 108. Id.  
 109. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(2)(a) (2018). 
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which directly and significantly aggravate the subsequent injury, and preexist-
ing injuries which resulted in the loss of a major extremity.110  Before the 2013 
Amendments took effect, 8,072 SIF claims were filed in 2013.111  In 2014, 
2015, and 2016, the SIF saw the claims filed decrease to 5,504; 3,121; and 
2,469, respectively.112  This significant decrease shows the beginning of a more 
pragmatic and sustainable Missouri SIF. 
In Gattenby v. Treasurer of Missouri,113 the Missouri Court of Appeals 
for the Western District came to a controversial decision which changed this 
trend of reduced SIF claims.114  The plaintiff in Gattenby suffered a workplace 
injury to his right knee in March of 2014 and had prior injuries from 2007, 
2009, and 2010.115  The Missouri SIF appealed a decision made by an admin-
istrative law judge that awarded permanent total disability benefits under Sec-
tion 287.220.2, arguing that the administrative law judge erred in applying this 
section instead of the new, more stringent 2013 Amendments.116  In its analy-
sis, the court parsed the language used in Section 287.220.3(1), which read 
“[a]ll claims against the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January 
1, 2014, and all claims against the second injury fund involving a subsequent 
compensable injury which is an occupational disease filed after January 1, 
2014, shall be compensated as provided in this subsection.”117  On its face, 
Section 287.220.3(1) seemed to require application of the more stringent Sec-
tion 287.220.3 to any claims for injury that occurred after January 1, 2014.118  
The Western District, however, did not agree with this interpretation.119 
The Western District noted that when it came to occupational diseases, 
the General Assembly specifically wrote “subsequent” instead of “prior” or 
“all.”120  The court determined that by referring to “subsequent occupational 
diseases” the General Assembly intended the new, more stringent, provision to 
apply to any claim utilizing only a subsequent occupational disease.121   
The court then turned to the provision which stated, “All claims against 
the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014 . . . shall be 
compensated as provided in this subsection.”122  The court noted that the Gen-
eral Assembly did not make the same distinction with occupational diseases, 
instead the General Assembly said “subsequent compensable injuries” when 
  
 110. Id.  
 111. 2017 Annual Report, supra note 100, at 22. 
 112. Id.  
 113. 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
 114. Id. at 860. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 861. 
 117. Id. at 862; MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220.3(1) (2018). 
 118. Gattenby, 516 S.W.3d at 862. 
 119. Id. at 862–63. 
 120. Id. at 862. 
 121. Id.   
 122. Id. at 861.  
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referring to an occupational disease.123  The court reasoned that since in one 
instance the statute said “for injuries” and in another it said “subsequent com-
pensable injuries,” the General Assembly intended the former to encompass all 
injuries whereas the latter encompassed only compensable ones.124  The court 
held that for all injuries that are not occupational diseases, both the preexisting 
disability and the subsequent injury must occur after January 1, 2014 for the 
more stringent 2013 Amendments of Section 287.220.3 to apply.125   
This resulted in the use of pre-2013 provisions of Section 287.220, which 
were much more favorable to the awarding of total disability benefits, in the 
event that any preexisting injury occurred before 2014.126  Before Gattenby, 
SIF claims had declined from 24,313 open claims against the SIF in 2015 to 
20,865 open claims in 2016.127  Following this ruling, however, the number of 
claims filed against the SIF spiked to 3,953 in 2017, compared to the 3,121 and 
2,469 claims filed in 2015 and 2016, respectively.128  Despite the court’s hold-
ing in Gattenby, the Missouri SIF refused to compensate claims for partial dis-
ability benefits filed after 2014, following the mandate of Section 
287.220.3(2).129   
This decision was validated in the recent Missouri Supreme Court deci-
sion Cosby v. Treasurer of Missouri.130  In Cosby, the Missouri Supreme Court 
considered whether Section 287.220.3 applied to a plaintiff who received an 
injury in 2014.131  Following the clear intent of the General Assembly – evi-
denced by how it defined “injury” – and the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
statute, the court determined that Section 287.220.3 should apply to all claims 
for work-related injuries that occur after January 1, 2014.132 
  
 123. Id. at 862.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. at 862–63. 
 127. MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2016 Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. & 
INDUS. RELATIONS, 23 (2016), https://labor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/2016-DWC-
Annual-Report.pdf [perma.cc/X9VR-WSQL]; MO. DIV. OF WORKER’S COMP., 2015 
Annual Report, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. RELATIONS, 23 (2015), https://la-
bor.mo.gov/sites/labor/files/pubs_forms/DWC2015AnnualReport.pdf. 
[perma.cc/UXT2-8UP8]. 
 128. 2017 Annual Report, supra note 100. 
 129. Missouri Labor Commission States Employers Are Now Responsible for En-
hanced Permanent Partial Disability Benefits in a Shift Away from the Second Injury 




 130. No. SC 97317, 2019 WL 2588575, at *1 (Mo. June 25, 2019).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/10
2019] SECOND INJURY FUNDS 865 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
SIFs and their counterparts throughout the United States cause problems 
for states that retain them.  They can be difficult to maintain due to their high 
amount of liability over time but can also be difficult to repeal because they 
support vulnerable, sympathetic constituents, such as war veterans.133  The 
ADA provided legislators with the justification necessary to eliminate the SIFs 
of their states while limiting political backlash.134 
Discrimination against disabled workers is still a prevalent issue, and the 
ADA has not solved the problem.135  Disabled workers’ employment has been 
in decline since the ADA was passed.136  Data shows that 2,107,000 disabled 
workers were employed in 2014 – an all-time low despite significant popula-
tion increases.137  This could be due in part to issues inherent with the ADA 
itself.  The ADA has the paradoxical effect of discouraging the hiring of disa-
bled employees despite clear impetus to hire them.138  This is because the ADA 
mandates reasonable accommodations from employers for their employees.139  
These accommodations generate expenses that are avoided where possible – 
despite the unambiguous illegality and threat of litigation under the ADA – 
because accommodations can be prohibitively expensive or impractical.140  
This is especially true considering the thresholds for disabilities under the ADA 
leave much to be desired and are considered under-inclusive in terms of cover-
ing disabled workers.141   
However, this decline has been sharper in states that have eliminated their 
SIFs since 2004, with a 9% decrease in disabled unemployment for SIF retain-
ing states and a 23% decrease in disabled unemployment for SIF eliminating 
states.142  Despite the apparent negative impact of the ADA on hiring disabled 
workers, the effect is even worse in states which have no SIF to cushion the 
  
 133. Tobenkin, supra note 7. 
 134. See Schurin, supra note77, at 136. 
 135. Id. at 155.  
 136. Id. at 154–55.  
 137. Lee S. VonSchrader, Disability Statistics from the Current Population Survey, 
CORNELL U. (2017), http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/reports/cps.cfm?statistic=em-
ployment [perma.cc/6EVG-W3C8]. 
 138. H. Stephen Kaye, Lita H. Jans, and Erica C. Jones, Why Don’t Employers Hire 
and Retain Workers with Disabilities? 21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 526, 528–31 
(2011); contra Les Picker, Did the ADA Reduce Employment of the Disabled?, THE 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (May 25, 2009), http://www.nber.org/di-
gest/nov04/w10528.html [perma.cc/J5TK-QP6Y]. 
 139. Kaye, supra note 138, at 529.  
 140. Id. at 534 (explaining that the cost of reasonable accommodations for employ-
ees is not fiscally justifiable for employers compared to the risk of lawsuit). 
 141. Schurin, supra note 77, at 153–54. 
 142. Id. at 154–55. 
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blow.143  This may be because the ADA and SIFs have different approaches to 
the same problem: the former discourages discriminatory practices and the lat-
ter encourages non-discriminatory practices.144 
Who should assume the liability when a SIF is repealed?  In Missouri, 
courts have conclusively agreed that liability shifts back to the employer.145  
Under the ADA, employers are unable to make employment decisions based 
on a belief that the new employee may increase workers’ compensation costs 
for the employer in the future.146  This essentially forces the employer to accept 
an employee as they are, including their “high risk” nature.147  This effect be-
comes especially pronounced in an aging workforce.148  The result of forcing 
this “high risk” liability on the employer creates the same result as reasonable 
accommodations under the ADA: the threat of hard to prove litigation will not 
override the financial concern of potential future liability for a workplace in-
jury.149  Because SIFs are prospective in nature – whereas the ADA is retro-
spective in nature – the former operates as the “carrot” and the latter as the 
“stick.”150  This contradicts the common perception that the two laws overlap 
in their function.151  This is not to say that the ADA is completely irrelevant to 
the purposes of a SIF – but rather they are complementary.152  The ideal ap-
proach would account for both the purpose and function of SIF statutes and the 
ADA.153  The ADA is capable of picking up the slack left behind by the repeal 
or reduction in scope of SIF statutes.154  This is the approach the Missouri Gen-
eral Assembly took in 2013 by reducing SIF liability for the less vital issues, 
which are still actionable under the ADA.155  This better serves the more press-
ing needs of permanent, totally disabled workers by increasing the SIFs overall 
ability to pay its liabilities.156 
In short, the ADA is not a compelling justification for an honest and in-
formed legislator to eliminate SIFs altogether, as the results and methods of the 
  
 143. Id. at 154.  
 144. Id. at 158–59. 
 145. See Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. 1963) (“[i]n 
the absence of an apportionment statute or second injury fund legislation, the employer 
is liable for the entire disability resulting from a compensable injury . . .”). 
 146. Hancock, supra note 71, at 540. 
 147. Gary Kern, Editorial: Gary Kern, in Defense of the Second Injury Fund, LA. 
COMP. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2017), http://compblog.com/editorial-gary-kern-in-defense-of-
the-second-injury-fund/ [perma.cc/UA64-6RKF]. 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. McClitis, supra note 57, at 415–16. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. MO. REV. STAT. § 287.220 (2018). 
 156. McClitis, supra note 57, at 416. 
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ADA are insufficient to achieve the goals of SIFs.  This begs the question of 
what a legislature should do if they cannot use the ADA to justify the removal 
of SIFs and they cannot allow the funds to continually accrue liability until the 
point of insolvency.157 
A.  The Missouri SIF’s Dilemma: Wait It Out or Take Action? 
The answer is likely somewhere in the middle.  States like Missouri have 
reduced the scope of SIFs in an effort to maintain solvency.158  Ideally, limiting 
liability will “encourage the employment of individuals who are already disa-
bled from a preexisting injury, regardless of the type or cause of that injury” 
while still managing to keep the costs of the SIF low enough to maintain sol-
vency.159  If the holding of Gattenby had been left undisturbed, the results could 
have been contrary to the goals of the 2013 legislation; namely, reducing lia-
bility of the SIF.160   
Prior to Gattenby, the primary issue facing the Missouri SIF was its “fi-
nancial status and future funding.”161  The 2013 Amendments purported to 
solve both of these issues by narrowing the types of claims that could be made 
against the Missouri SIF after a certain date and allowing for a temporary in-
crease to the surcharge that funded the SIF.162   
After Gattenby, the less favorable 2013 Amendment language only ap-
plied to claims where both the prior and the subsequent injury occurred after 
January 1, 2014.163  The result is a gradual reduction in liability to the SIF over 
the years, as less claims receive the more favorable pre-2013 Amendment lan-
guage simply because fewer prior injuries happened before 2014.  For example, 
in the year 2060, there will be far less claims using the pre-2013 language, 
simply because far fewer workers will have even been alive before 2014 to 
receive an injury in the first place. As time passes, the revised SIF language 
will achieve the ultimate goal of limiting the overall liability of the Missouri 
SIF.  Even with the changes, SIF liability is still too high and not decreasing 
fast enough.164  An increase in surcharges alone is insufficient to permanently 
  
 157. Id. at 412 (explaining that SIF liability would remain even after the law itself 
is repealed). 
 158. See infra Part III.B. 
 159. Pierson v. Treasurer of Mo., 126 S.W.3d 386, 389–90 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (citing Boring v. Treasurer of Mo., 947 S.W.2d 483, 487-88 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1997), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003) 
(en banc)). 
 160. See Gattenby v. Treasurer of Mo., 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2017). 
 161. McClitis, supra note 57, at 416. 
 162. See infra Part III.B. 
 163. 516 S.W.3d at 862. 
 164. 2017 Annual Report, supra note 100, at 22 (showing an increase in claims 
against the Missouri SIF after the Gattenby decision). 
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lower SIF liability because the surcharge increase is set to end in 2021.165  The 
surcharge increase was meant to serve as a temporary basis for repairing an 
insolvent fund, but a virtually unchanged mode of liability may negate that ef-
fect.166  By the time liability is lessened – which could have taken a while under 
Gattenby – the surcharge will be gone and the Missouri SIF would have been 
in the same financially precarious situation it found itself in to begin with.167  
The Missouri SIF, however, does not have this problem any longer due to the 
ruling in Cosby. 
The abrogation of Gattenby does not necessarily solve all of the Missouri 
SIF’s problems.  The 2013 Amendments, while important to maintaining the 
Missouri SIF, may have actually harmed it by negatively affecting the employ-
ment rates of individuals with disabilities.168  In the span of a single year fol-
lowing the amendments, disabled employment took a significant dip, though it 
quickly recovered.169 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Missouri SIF has maintained solvency and stayed active by reducing 
its scope of liability.  To keep the SIF functional, the General Assembly has 
taken steps to continuously reduce this liability as time goes on.  Despite a brief 
period of uncertainty due to the decision in Gattenby, the Missouri SIF’s fate 
was unclear. The Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in Cosby has helped to 
clarify the Missouri SIF’s fate.  Despite this, the road to continued solvency is 
not a simple one.  As the Missouri SIF begins to recover financially, it may 
renew the vigor with which litigants pursue their claims, driving up the Mis-
souri SIF’s liability yet again.  This may require continued maintenance of the 
Missouri SIF over time, such as structural changes to its funding or further 
reductions in liability. 
The General Assembly should understand that the SIF is worthwhile be-
cause it produces valuable benefits for at-risk populations. The SIF’s liabilities 
can be reduced by introducing simple, clear, and consistent legislative language 
– such that it avoids the issue found in Gattenby – that serves to protect disabled 
workers.  In 2009, another commentator stated, “It will take a commitment by 
the legislature to make changes to the [Missouri SIF] and to reevaluate such 
  
 165. MO REV. STAT. § 287.715.6 (2018). 
 166. Id.  
 167. McClitis, supra note 57, at 418. 
 168. Compare Lee Erickson, 2014 Disability Status Report: Missouri, CORNELL 
UNIVERSITY YANG TAN INST. ON EMP. AND DISABILITY, 5 (2016), http://www.disabil-
itystatistics.org/StatusReports/2014-PDF/2014-StatusReport_MO.pdf, 
[perma.cc/694B-AMP8] with Lee Erickson, 2013 Disability Status Report: Missouri, 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY YANG TAN INST. ON EMP. AND DISABILITY, 5 (2015), 
http://www.disabilitystatistics.org/StatusReports/2013-PDF/2013-
StatusReport_MO.pdf. [perma.cc/R7Z2-DGWU]. 
 169. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.  
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changes to determine their effectiveness.”170  The future effectiveness of the 
2013 amendments is questionable, but the attempt to limit liability, adequately 
finance the SIF, and improve the labor market for disabled workers are worth-
while goals. The question remains whether the legislature will need to reeval-
uate the SIF and institute further changes to maintain solvency of the Missouri 
SIF.  Doing so may just guarantee the continued protection of disabled employ-
ees by the Second Injury Fund for generations to come. 
  
 170. McClitis, supra note 57, at 422. 
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APPENDIX A: LIABILITY PORTIONS OF SIF STATUTES BY STATE 
 
State Sunset No Congruent 
SIF 
Statute 
Alabama   ALA. CODE § 25-5-57 
(1975) (repealed 1992) 
Alaska   ALASKA STAT. § 
23.30.205 (West 2018) 
Arizona   ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
23-1065 (2019) 
Arkansas   ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
525 (2019) 
California   CAL. LAB. CODE § 4751 ( 
(2019) 
Colorado x  COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-
46-101 (2018) 
Connecticut x  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-
349 (2019) 
Delaware   DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19 
§ 2327 (2017) 
Florida x  FLA. STAT. § 440.49 
(2018) 
Georgia x  GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-
360 (2018) 
Hawaii   HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-
33 (2018) 
Idaho   IDAHO CODE § 72-332 
(2019) 
Illinois   820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
305/8 (2016) 
Indiana   IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-
3-13 (LexisNexis 2014) 
Iowa   IOWA CODE § 85.64 
(2019) 
Kansas x  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
567 (West 2018) 
Kentucky x  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
342.120 (West 2019) 
Louisiana   LA. STAT. ANN. § 
23:1378 (2019) 
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Maine   ME. STAT. tit. 39 § 57 
(1990) (repealed 1991)171 
Maryland   MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
EMPL. § 9-802 (West 
2018) 
Massachusetts   MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 152, § 37 (West 2019) 
Michigan   MICH. COMP. LAWS Ann. 
§ 418.521 (West 2019) 
Minnesota   MINN. STAT. Ann. § 
176.131 (West 1990) (re-
pealed 1992) 
Mississippi   MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-3-
73 (West 2019) 
Missouri   MO. REV. STAT. § 
287.220 (2018) 
Montana   MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-
71-907 (West 2018) 
Nebraska x  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
48-128 (LexisNexis 
2014) 
Nevada   NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
616B.587 (LexisNexis 
2014) 
New Hampshire   N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
281-A:54 (West 2019) 
New Jersey   N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-
95 (West 2018) 
New Mexico   N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-2-
6 (2018) (repealed 1996) 
New York x  N.Y. WORKER’S COMP. 
LAW § 15 (McKinney 
2018) 
North Carolina   N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-
40.1 (2018) 
North Dakota   N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-
04-18 (2013) 
Ohio   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4123.343 (Lexis Nexis 
2016) 
  
 171. See also Church v. McKee, 387 A.2d 754, 755–56 (Me. 1978) (utilizing the 
liability of the now-repealed fund) 
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Oklahoma   OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 
172 (2011) (repealed 
2011) 
Oregon  x OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
656.622 (West 2019) 
Pennsylvania   77 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 516 (West 
2019) 
Rhode Island   28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-
37-4 (1997) (repealed 
1998) 
South Carolina x  S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-
400 (2018) 
South Dakota x  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
62-4-34 (1998) (repealed 
1999) 
Tennessee   TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-
6-2018 (2018); 
Texas   TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 
408.162 (West 2019) 
Utah   UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-
2-703 (Lexis Nexis 
2018)172 
Vermont  x Never functional173 
Virginia   VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-
1103 (2018) 
Washington   WASH. REV. CODE § 
5116.120 (2018) 
West Virginia x  W. VA. CODE § 23-4-9b 
(2018) 
Wisconsin   WIS. STAT. § 102.59 
(2018) 
Wyoming  x See Hancock, supra note 
71, at 543 (arguing for 
the implementation of a 




 172. See Second Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 F.2d 1176, 1183 (Utah 
1985) (describing nature of SIF liability). 
 173. See S.C. Audit, supra note 66 (referencing the inoperability of Vermont’s sec-
ond injury fund). 
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